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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Tricia Franklin appeals from her judgment for felony DUI, I.C. §§ 18-8004; 
8005(6).  Ms. Franklin entered a conditional plea of guilty to felony DUI, preserving the 
right to appeal the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress the results of a 
warrantless blood draw conducted upon her.  On appeal, she asserts that 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. __, 
133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), and this Court’s recent opinions in State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416 
(2014), and State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643 (2014), require that her conviction be 
vacated because the district court erred by denying the motion to suppress the results 
of her warrantless blood draw. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 On February 6, 2013, Deputy Robert Tatilian was working patrol duty for Boise 
County when he encountered Ms. Franklin “staggering on to Middlefork Road heading 
toward the Longhorn.”  (12/26/15 Tr., p.8, Ls.7-12.)  According to Deputy Tatilian, 
Ms. Franklin indicated that she was looking for her boyfriend and he could “smell strong 
odor of alcohol coming from her person.”  (12/26/13 Tr., p.8, L.17 – p.9, L.2.)  Later that 
same day at around 8:30 p.m., Deputy Tatilian received a call from dispatch regarding a 
possible intoxicated driver that had left the Longhorn while operating a 90s model Ford 
pickup.  (12/26/13 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-11; 7/22/13 Tr., p.28, Ls.17-20.)  Deputy Tatilian 
encountered the vehicle at the Wander Inn and made contact with Ms. Franklin and her 
boyfriend Mr. Snowball.  (12/26/13 Tr., p.17, Ls.17-23.)  Deputy Tatilian testified that it 
“was quite apparent that both of them were quite intoxicated.  They stated that they 
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were intoxicated.”  (7/22/13 Tr., p.29, Ls.18-25.)  Deputy Tatilian informed the couple, “If 
I see this vehicle move again, I will be arresting you for DUI.”  (7/22/13 Tr., p.30, Ls.1-
4.) 
 Approximately an hour and a half later, at 10:12 p.m., Deputy Tatilian testified 
that he “received a call that that vehicle was involved in an accident on Banks Lowman 
Road. . . .”   (7/22/13 Tr., p.30, Ls.19-22; 12/26/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.12-14.)  Based on the 
description of the vehicle, Deputy Tatilian immediately thought it might be the same 
vehicle and driver he had contacted at the Wander Inn and that the driver “had been 
under the influence.”  (7/22/13 Tr., p.43, Ls.4-12.)  At the time Deputy Tatilian was 
contacted, he had just returned to his residence in Boise from his shift and was in the 
process of taking off his police uniform.  (12/26/13 Tr., p.9, L.24 – p.10, L.4.)  Deputy 
Tatilian then “got back in uniform” and headed back to Boise County, which took 
approximately 35 minutes.  (12/26/13 Tr., p.10, Ls.1-16.)  Deputy Tatilian arrived at the 
location of the single vehicle accident at 10:47 p.m. and “recognized the vehicle as 
being the red Ford pickup, 1A-1P638,” and learned Ms. Franklin had been its driver.  
(7/22/13 Tr., p.31, L.7 – p.33, L.18, p.43, L.22 – p.44, L.3.)  By the time Deputy Tatilian 
had arrived, Ms. Franklin had already been immobilized on a board, transferred to the 
care of the Crouch Ambulance, and was being transported to a landing zone in Banks 
for Life Flight transport.  (7/22/13 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-16; 12/26/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.3-21.) 
 John Devalle, the fire chief for Garden Valley Fire was already on the scene upon 
Deputy Tatilian’s arrival.  (12/23/13 Tr., p.31, Ls.7-10.)  Ms. Franklin informed 
Mr. Devalle that she was the only person in the vehicle.  (12/23/13 Tr., p.32, Ls.2-7.)  In 
talking with Ms. Franklin, Mr. Devalle noticed the “pretty obvious” odor of alcoholic 
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beverages emitting from Ms. Frankin’s breath.  (12/23/13 Tr., p.32, Ls.8-17.)  
Mr. Devalle passed that information on to Deputy Tatilian upon his arrival and provided 
the deputy with a written statement.  (12/23/13 Tr., p.32, Ls.18-25.)   
 Based upon his previous contact with Ms. Franklin and the information he had 
received at the scene of the accident, at approximately 11:17 p.m. Deputy Tatilian 
contacted Boise County dispatch to seek a phlebotomist and Deputy Dale Rogers to 
accomplish of blood draw of Ms. Franklin upon her Life Flight arrival in Boise.  (12/26/13 
Tr., p.14, L.22 – p.15, L.7; 7/22/13 Tr., p.34, Ls.15-20.)  After securing the scene of the 
accident, Deputy Tatilian went to the Wander Inn to satisfy himself that Mr. Snowball 
was not involved in the accident.  (12/26/13 Tr., p.15, L.16 – p.16, L.8.)  Deputy Tatilian 
conceded that he made no attempt to obtain a warrant as Boise County was relying on 
the implied consent law.  (12/26/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.15-23.) 
 Phlebotomist Janet Schaadt was contacted by dispatch at approximately 11:15 
p.m. and asked to drive to Saint Al’s to conduct a blood draw on a patient arriving via 
Life Flight.  (12/23/13 Tr., p.9, L.2 – p.10, L.17.)  Chief Deputy Rogers was also 
contacted by dispatch and asked to travel to the hospital for the blood draw.  (12/26/13 
Tr., p.40, L.14 – p.41, L.20.)  Ms. Schaadt arrived at the hospital at approximately 11:30 
p.m. and testified that the Life Flight helicopter transporting Ms. Franklin arrived at 12:20 
a.m.  (12/23/13 Tr., p.23, Ls.12-24.)  Ms. Franklin was not cooperative and refused to 
consent to provide the blood sample “many times.”  (12/26/13 Tr., p.43, L.24 – p.44, 
L.22, p.48, Ls.3-25.)  The blood draw was completed at 12:40 a.m.  (12/23/13 Tr., p.23, 
Ls.22-25.) 
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 Ms. Franklin was charged by Information with felony DUI and misdemeanor 
driving without privileges.  (R., pp.19-21.)  Ms. Franklin filed a motion to suppress the 
results of the blood draw in her case and supporting memorandum.  (R., pp.25-46.)  
Following two separate hearings on the motion to suppress, the district court entered a 
memorandum decision and order denying Ms. Franklin’s motion to suppress.  
(R., pp.74-88.)  Relying on State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 (2007), the district court 
concluded that Ms. Franklin impliedly consented to the warrantless blood draw and the 
United States Supreme Court decision in McNeely did nothing to change that outcome.  
(R., pp.83-85.)  With regard to the State’s argument that there were sufficient exigencies 
to excuse the requirement of a warrant, the district court found that an exigency existed. 
The State argues that there are exigent circumstances associated 
with obtaining an after hours search warrant in Boise County.  In the 
Court’s view, this argument by itself is not convincing.  As noted above, at 
the time of this accident, the Boise County Sherriff’s [sic] Office did not 
seek a warrant based upon its view that under the implied consent law, as 
construed by the Idaho Courts, there was no need for a search warrant.  
As a result, there was not attempt to obtain an after hours warrant for a 
blood draw in a DUI investigation.  The State’s argument that there would 
have been difficulties in obtaining a search warrant in a timely fashion is 
based upon largely speculative concerns.  Here, law enforcement did not 
make any effort to secure a warrant and the State has not presented facts 
that would have demonstrated that the effort would have resulted in a 
sufficient delay as to adversely affect the test results.  There is a full-time 
magistrate in Boise County.  The County has an elected prosecuting 
attorney who is a resident of the county.  The Sheriff’s office certainly 
knows where the magistrate and prosecutor reside, and know how to 
contact each in the event of an emergency.  Deputies in the field can 
contact dispatch and other officers by radio.  The magistrate can be 
contacted personally, or by phone, either by the officer, or through 
assistance of dispatch.  The Sheriff’s office was also aware that there is 
always an on call prosecutor and magistrate in Ada County for after hours 
warrant applications.  The State has failed to demonstrate that efforts to 
obtain a search warrant would have resulted in delays that could have 
adversely affected the investigation. 
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Notwithstanding that the State has made no effort to obtain a 
warrant, considering all the circumstances, the Court does conclude that 
there are exigent circumstances excusing a warrant in this case.  The 
accident was reported just prior to 10:12 p.m.  The officer did not complete 
his investigation and conclude that Franklin was the driver until about 
midnight, almost two (2) hours after the accident.  Because of this, the 
Court concludes that the additional time it would have taken to obtain a 
warrant would likely have resulted in such a delay as to potentially deprive 
the state of important evidence of alcohol concentration.  The Court will 
find that the delay occasioned by the time necessary to conclude the 
investigation and determine that Franklin was the driver constitutes 
exigent circumstances.  The process to obtain a warrant could not have 
begun until about midnight.  The further delay in obtaining a warrant 
meant that there would have been a total delay of at least two (2) or three 
(3) hours.  Such a delay would have permitted further elimination of 
alcohol that could have materially affected the State’s ability to prove an 
alcohol concentration above the legal limit.  
 
(R., pp.86-87.) 
 With regard to the State’s argument that public interest would be served by 
disregarding Ms. Franklin’s constitutional rights due to the nature of her actions of 
driving while impaired, the district court concluded, “In all candor, this argument from the 
State’s attorney is shocking to this Court.  Franklin is presumed innocent and whether 
Franklin is guilty of any offense is for the jury to decide.”  (R., p.87.)  After quoting 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1938) and referencing Comment (1) to Rule 
3.8 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, the district court declined the States 
“invitation to ignore Franklin’s constitutional rights to facilitate the State’s ability to 
convict.”  (R., p.88.) 
 Ms. Franklin then entered a conditional plea of guilty to felony DUI, preserving 
the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress.  (R., pp.121-127, 129.)  The 
district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with one year fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction over Ms. Franklin.  (R., pp.130-133.)  Thereafter, the district court entered an 
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Order Staying Execution of Judgment pending the outcome of the appeal.  (R., pp.135-
136.)  Ms. Franklin filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s judgment of 
conviction.  (R., pp.137-140.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Franklin’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Franklin’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Ms. Franklin asserts that, because implied consent as a warrant exception is an 
unconstitutional per se rule, and the State did not meet its burden to establish the 
presence of an exigent circumstance to circumvent the requirement of a warrant, the 
blood draw was unlawful.  The district court erred by denying her motion to suppress the 
results of that warrantless blood draw. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, this Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact 
which were supported by substantial evidence but freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found.  State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Franklin’s Motion To Suppress 
 
In this case, the district court ruled that the blood draw was valid under Idaho’s 
implied consent law as interpreted by Diaz and the exigent circumstances exception to 
the warrant requirement because the warrant application process could not have started 
until after midnight and it would have taken “at least two (2) to three (3) hours” to obtain 
the warrant.  (R., pp.78-88.)  In light of Schneckloth, McNeely, Wulff, and Halseth, and 
the district court’s clearly erroneous factual findings that the warrant application process 
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could not have begun until after midnight and would have taken at least two to three 
hours, the district court erred in denying Ms. Franklin’s suppression motion.   
The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause.” A warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within a 
recognized exception.  See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). 
That principle applies to the type of search at issue in this case, which involves a 
compelled physical intrusion beneath Ms. Franklin’s skin and into his veins to obtain a 
sample of his blood for use as evidence in a criminal investigation.  “Such an invasion of 
bodily integrity implicates an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations 
of privacy.’”  Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (citing 
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 
489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). 
Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution is substantially similar to the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
“The Fourth Amendment and art. 1 § 17 are designed to protect a person’s legitimate 
expectation of privacy, which ‘society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”  State v. 
Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 749 (1988) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 
(1978) (citations omitted)).  The similarity of language and purpose, however, does not 
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require this Court to follow United States Supreme Court precedent in interpreting our 
own constitution.  See id. at 748. 
When a warrantless search or seizure has occurred, the State bears a heavy 
burden to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement.  Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 749-750 (1984); State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225 (1993).  If evidence is not 
seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence 
discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree.”  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Koivu, 152 
Idaho 511, 519 (2012). 
     
1. The Warrantless Blood Draw Was Illegal As Ms. Franklin Revoked Any 
Consent She Had Impliedly Given 
 
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court addressed a blood draw as a Fourth 
Amendment violation.  See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In 
Schmerber, the petitioner and a companion had been drinking at a bar in a bowling 
alley. 384 U.S. at 758 n.2. After the pair left the bowling alley, the car which the 
petitioner was driving skidded, crossed the road, and struck a tree.  Id.  Both the 
petitioner and his companion were injured and taken to the hospital for treatment.  Id.  
At the hospital, a police officer directed a physician to draw a blood sample from the 
petitioner.  Id. at 758.  The results revealed a percent by weight of alcohol in the 
petitioner’s blood, which indicated intoxication, and those results were admitted at the 
petitioner’s trial.  Id. at 759.  The petitioner objected to the admission of the results, 
arguing that his blood was drawn despite his refusal to consent to the test.  Id.   
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The Schmerber Court found no Fourth Amendment violation stemming from the 
warrantless taking of the petitioner’s blood under the unique facts of the case. 
Specifically, the Court relied on the dissipation of alcohol from the blood as a relevant 
factor in applying the exigency exception to the warrant requirement.  To support that 
conclusion it pointed out that the officer investigating the accident encountered the 
defendant at the accident scene; the defendant smelled of alcohol; the passenger in 
defendant’s car was injured and taken to the hospital; the investigating officer arrived at 
the hospital where defendant was being treated almost two hours after the accident; 
and finally, the defendant was placed under arrest.  Id.  The Schmerber Court stated: 
We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to 
diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to 
eliminate it from the system.  Particularly in a case such as this, where 
time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate 
the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and 
secure a warrant.  Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt 
to secure evidence of blood alcohol content in this case was an 
appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest. 
 
Id. at 771 (emphasis added).  However, the Court did not establish a per se rule: 
 
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on the 
facts of the present record.  The integrity of an individual’s person is a 
cherished value of our society.  That we today hold that the Constitution 
does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual’s body under 
stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more 
substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.  
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
   
The United States Supreme Court recently rejected the notion that a DUI 
investigation, by itself, justifies dispensing with the warrant requirement.  Missouri v. 
McNeely 569 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013).  In McNeely, the respondent was validly 
stopped, and, after declining to take a breath test, was arrested and taken to a nearby 
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hospital for a blood draw.  Id. at 1557-1558.  At the hospital, Mr. McNeely refused to 
consent to the blood draw, but the officer ordered the technician to take the blood 
anyway.  Id.  The officer never attempted to secure a search warrant.  Id.  
Mr. McNeely’s blood alcohol content (“BAC”) measured at .154 percent.  Id.  
Mr. McNeely’s suppression motion was granted and the Missouri Supreme Court 
affirmed the lower court’s order granting suppression of the BAC results, relying on 
Schmerber.  Id.    
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the 
circuits as to whether “the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a 
per se exigency that it suffices on its own to justify and exception to the warrant 
requirement. . . .”  Id. at 1558.  The McNeely Court held that it did not: “[i]n those drunk-
driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a 
blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, 
the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do that.”  Id. 133 S.Ct. at 1561.  The Court 
first recognized the importance of the privacy interest at stake, holding that “absent an 
emergency, no less [than a warrant] could be required where intrusions in to the human 
body are concerned,” and that the importance of a determination by a neutral and 
detached magistrate before law enforcement is allowed to “invade another’s body in 
search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.”  Id. at 1558.  The Court reiterated 
what was seemingly forgotten by lower courts after Schmerber:  to determine whether 
an officer faced an emergency which would justify alleviating the requirement of a 
warrant, the Court looks to the totality of the circumstances.  Id. at 1559.   
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As part of the analysis, the Court observed that the dissipation of alcohol in the 
blood stream is different “in critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases in 
which the police are truly confronted with a ‘now or never’ situation.”  Id. at 1561 (citing 
Rhoaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973)).  While BAC evidence from an alleged 
drunk driver naturally dissipates over time, its dissipation is gradual and relatively 
predictable.  Id.  In addition, there is always a time gap at issue in each case where the 
officer has to transport the suspect to the place where the blood is to be drawn and is 
required to read all of the administrative license suspension warnings to each suspect.  
Id.  These delays, in conjunction with advances in technology making it much easier to 
obtain a warrant, make the use of a per se rule unreasonable and violative of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 1561-1562.  The McNeely Court concluded, “[w]e hold that in drunk-
driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not 
constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without 
a warrant.”  Id. at 1568.   
 Thus, in McNeely, the Court held that the use of a per se warrant exception rule 
was unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment.  McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1561-
1562.  The McNeely Court specifically stated,  
“[h]ere and in its own courts the State based its case on an insistence that 
a driver who declines to submit to testing after being arrested for driving 
under the influence of alcohol is always subject to a nonconsensual blood 
test without any precondition for a warrant. That is incorrect.” 
   
Id. at 1568.   
 The McNeely Court used a totality of the circumstances analysis because a 
“case-by case assessment of exigency” was the traditional test.  Id. at 1561.  The Idaho 
Supreme Court has recently agreed that implied consent is a per se rule and, therefore, 
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not a valid exception to the warrant requirement.  See State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, __, 
337 P.3d 575, 582 (2014).  The Court concluded:  
Because McNeely prohibits per se exceptions to the warrant requirement 
and the district court correctly understood Idaho's implied consent statute 
operated as a per se exception, Idaho’s implied consent statute does not 
fall under the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. Thus, we overrule [State v.] Diaz[, 144 Idaho 300 
(2007)] and [State v.] Woolery[, 116 Idaho 368 (1989)] to the extent that 
they applied Idaho’s implied consent statute as an irrevocable per se rule 
that constitutionally allowed forced warrantless blood draws. 
Id.  Further, “irrevocable implied consent operates as a per se rule that cannot fit under 
the consent exception because it does not always analyze the voluntariness of that 
consent. Voluntariness has always been analyzed under the totality of the 
circumstances approach: ‘whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ ... is a 
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.’”  Id., 157 
Idaho at __, 337 P.3d at 581 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.) 
 Similarly, in Halseth, the Idaho Supreme Court clearly held that, “an implied 
consent statute such as Washington’s and Idaho’s does not justify a warrantless blood 
draw from a driver who refuses to consent, [. . .] or objects to the blood draw, as did 
Defendant in this case. Consent to a search must be voluntary.”  State v. Halseth, 157 
Idaho 643, ___ (2014) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232-33).   
It is undisputed that Ms. Franklin did not consent to the warrantless blood draw in 
her case, and expressly withdrew any purported consent under the implied consent 
statute.  (See 12/26/13 Tr., p.43, L.24 – p.44, L.22, p.48, Ls.3-25.)  Therefore, the 
warrantless search was not valid under the consent exception and the fruits of that 
unreasonable, warrantless search must be suppressed. 
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2. The State Failed To Meet Its Burden To Prove That The Facts Presented 
An Exigent Circumstance To Justify Dispensing With The Warrant 
Requirement  
  
In addition to finding that the blood draw was justified by the consent exception to 
the warrant requirement, the district court also concluded that the situation presented an 
exigent circumstance.  Specifically, the district court concluded that Deputy Tatilian did 
not complete his investigation and conclude that Ms. Franklin was the driver until about 
midnight and it would have taken two to three hours to obtain a warrant at that point.  
(R., pp.85-88.)  Ms. Franklin asserts that both of the above findings by the district court 
are clearly erroneous and not supported by any evidence in the record before the 
district court.  Ms. Franklin asserts that the State met its burden to establish that “there 
was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant” such that the warrantless, 
nonconsensual blood draw was permissible under the exigent circumstances exception 
to the warrant requirement.  Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (emphasis added). 
 
a. The District Court’s Pertinent Factual Findings Were Clearly 
Erroneous And Not Supported By The Evidence Offered By The 
State 
 
 The district court’s finding that exigent circumstances existed to justify the 
warrantless search of Ms. Franklin’s person is premised upon factual findings by the 
district court which, were not supported by substantial or competent evidence.  On 
appeal, this Court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 375 (Ct. App. 2007).  Findings are clearly 
erroneous when they are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence.  State v. 
Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659 (2007). 
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First, the district court concluded that Deputy Rogers’ account that, he was 
requested to assist in the blood draw at approximately midnight, was credible.  
(R., p.81.)  Along the same lines, the district court also found that Officer Tatilian did not 
complete his investigation and conclude that Ms. Franklin was the driver until about 
midnight.  (R., p.86.)  Based on its reliance on the above facts, the district court found 
that the warrant process could not have begun until midnight.  (R., p.86.)  The district 
court’s factual findings are not based upon competent evidence and entirely disregard 
the testimony of Ms. Schaadt and the dispatch records.  At the preliminary hearing, 
without any reference to a specific time, Deputy Tatilian stated that after searching for a 
second occupant of the vehicle, he radioed dispatch to have them contact Chief Deputy 
Rogers to do a blood draw.  (7/2213 Tr., p.34, Ls.12-20.)  However, according to the 
dispatch log, Deputy Tatilian contacted dispatch, by way of radio at 11:17 p.m. “to seek 
a phlebotomist and officer to accomplish a blood draw” on Ms. Franklin.  (12/26/13 
Tr., p.14, L.22 – p.15, p.7.)  This testimony by Deputy Tatilian, which was based upon 
dispatch records, is consistent with the testimony and record keeping of Phlebotomist 
Schaadt who testified that she was contacted by dispatch at 11:15 p.m. to travel to Saint 
Al’s to conduct a blood draw on a patient arriving via Life Flight.  (12/23/13 Tr., p.9, L.2 
– p.10, L.17.)  Rather than relying on testimony based upon two independent written 
records, the district court found Deputy Rogers credible based upon his testimony that 
he “estimated the time to be 12:20, 12:30, or actually 0020, 0030 on the 7th.”  (7/22/13 
Tr., p.61, Ls.14-17.)  In other words, Deputy Rogers was attempting to “estimate” the 
precise time he was contacted in the middle of the night some five months earlier.   
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Even more concerning, just five months later, Deputy Rogers was called to testify 
at the suppression hearing and asked if he recalled being present and testifying during 
the preliminary hearing, he stated:  “You know, I could have been.  I don’t have - - I 
don’t recall it.  I don’t have any recollection of it.  I have a lot of responsibilities and I’m 
not trying to keep track of all of my conversations.”  (12/26/13 Tr., p.46, Ls.15-22.)  
Accordingly, the district court’s finding that Deputy Roger’s recollection of the time in 
which he was contacted to do the blood draw and the time Deputy Tatilian requested a 
blood draw were both not supported by competent evidence presented below.  Thus, 
the district court’s factual findings as to when the parties were contacted to perform the 
warrantless blood draw were clearly erroneous. 
The second finding upon which the district court premised its conclusion that 
exigent circumstances existed was its determination that it would have taken at least 
two to three hours to obtain a warrant for the blood draw.  The State, however, did not 
offer any evidence on how long it would take to obtain a telephonic warrant for a blood 
draw upon Ms. Franklin and in fact, there is no evidence in the record as to how long it 
would have taken to obtain a warrant.  In fact, in its memorandum opinion, the district 
court itself acknowledged and found that “law enforcement did not make any effort to 
secure a warrant and the State has not presented facts that would have demonstrated 
that the effort would have resulted in a sufficient delay as to adversely affect the test 
results.”  (R., p.86.)  The district court then discussed in length the resources available 
to law enforcement in obtaining a warrant.  (See R., p.86.)  Thus, the district court’s 
findings that the warrant process did not begin until about midnight and it would have 
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taken at least two to three hours to obtain a warrant are not supported by the evidence 
in the record.  
 
b. The State Failed To Meet Its Burden To Prove Exigent 
Circumstances Existed 
 
To determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that 
justified acting without a warrant, this Court looks to the totality of circumstances. 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006)).  
Because the district court found that the search was conducted without a warrant, the 
burden shifts to the State to prove an exception to the warrant requirement.  Thus, the 
State is required to prove that “there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a 
warrant” such that the warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw was permissible under 
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.  Here, the record is 
replete with evidence that the State had more than ample time to request and obtain a 
warrant prior to intruding into Ms. Franklin’s body in search of evidence of her guilt. 
The accident in this case happened a little before 10:12 p.m. and Deputy Tatilian 
testified he was informed that the single vehicle accident involved a Ford pickup.   
(7/22/13 Tr., p.30, Ls.19-22; 12/26/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.12-14.)  Earlier that day, he had 
encountered Ms. Franklin, the driver of the vehicle, on two separate occasions and each 
time believed her to be under the influence of alcohol.    (12/26/13 Tr., p.8, L.17 – p.9, 
L.2; 7/22/13 Tr., p.29, Ls.18-25.)  In fact, Deputy Tatilian had informed Ms. Franklin, “If I 
see this vehicle move again, I will be arresting you for DUI.”  (7/22/13 Tr., p.30, Ls.1-4.)  
Then, upon arrival at the scene of the accident at 10:47 p.m. Deputy Tatilian recognized 
the vehicle as being the red Ford pickup he had seen earlier and learned Ms. Franklin 
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had been its driver.  (7/22/13 Tr., p.31, L.7 – p.33, L.18, p.43, L.22 – p.44, L.3.)  Deputy 
Tatilian was also informed that Ms. Franklin was the only person in the vehicle and 
smelled of alcohol immediately after the accident.  (12/23/13 Tr., p.32, Ls.2-25.)   
 In light of all of this, at approximately 11:17 p.m. Deputy Tatilian contacted Boise 
County dispatch to seek a phlebotomist and Deputy Rogers to accomplish of blood 
draw of Ms. Franklin upon her Life Flight arrival in Boise.  (12/26/13 Tr., p.14, L.22 – 
p.15, L.7; 7/22/13 Tr., p.34, Ls.15-20.)  At that time, Deputy Tatilian had decided that he 
could arrest Ms. Franklin for DUI and had ample time and ability to seek a warrant, but 
failed to do so.  The blood draw was not completed until 12:40 a.m., and as such 
Deputy Titilian had almost an hour and one-half to request and obtain a warrant to draw 
Ms. Franklin’s blood.  (12/23/13 Tr., p.23, Ls.22-25.) 
For the reasons set forth above, the State has failed to meet its burden and as 
such, the district court erred in denying Ms. Franklin’s motion to suppress.   Therefore, 
the warrantless search was not valid under either the consent or exigent circumstances 
exceptions and the fruits of that unreasonable, warrantless search must be suppressed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Ms. Franklin respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order 
denying her motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 26th day of January, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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